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WHY IS ‘THE DUTCH DISEASE’ ALWAYS A DISEASE?* 
THE MACROECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF  
SCALING UP ODA 
Terry McKinley** 
ABSTRACT 
This working paper examines the validity of the claim that ‘scaling up’ ODA in developing 
countries will cause ‘Dutch Disease’ effects that slow growth and human development.  
The most common concerns are increased inflation and exchange-rate appreciation. 
Consistent with a recent IMF re-appraisal, the paper maintains that such problems can be 
mitigated if ODA is properly ‘spent’ and ‘absorbed’. However, many governments either do 
not spend ODA (because of the fear of inflation) or do not ‘absorb’ it (because of the fear of 
appreciation). The paper argues that the critical issues are whether 1) increased government 
spending is focused on public investment and 2) increased imports are focused on capital 
goods. A central point is that in many developing countries, under-utilized productive 
capacities can readily respond to rising government demand for domestic goods and 
services. The paper ends with the warning that although the short-run macroeconomic 
impact of ODA can be managed, its longer-term impact could, indeed, be adverse if it 
reduces efforts to mobilize domestic resources, such as public revenue and national savings. 
 
 
                                                          
* And why are the Dutch always blamed for such a malady? 
** UNDP, New York. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Why do many economists believe that in developing countries a large surge of capital inflows, 
such as Official Development Assistance, will lead to a ‘Dutch Disease’, and not development? 
What, exactly, is a ‘Dutch Disease’ and why is it considered to be invariably detrimental to 
development?1 This brief paper attempts to address these issues. 
The advocacy of the U.N. Millennium Project for a large scaling up of Official Development 
Assistance to reach the Millennium Development Goals has raised fears about a new epidemic 
of ‘Dutch Disease’ among developing countries. However, recent research by the International 
Monetary Fund has helped contribute to a more sensible, balanced evaluation than before of 
the validity of such fears (IMF 2005a and Gupta et al. 2005). 
If ODA is effective, it should lead to a transfer of real resources to a developing-country 
recipient. And these resources should, it is assumed, contribute to improved human 
development and enhanced prospects for domestic capital accumulation and sustained 
economic growth. However, even if there were a real transfer of resources in the short term, 
such success would not lead necessarily to sustained growth and human development. These 
two issues are separable. This paper addresses primarily the short-run dynamics and focuses 
on the effects of ODA on growth.2 
TABLE 1 
ODA As a Share of National Income and Investment 
Grouping Aid as % of GNI1990-94 
Aid as % of GNI 
2000-03 
Aid as % of GCF 
1990-94 
Aid as % of GCF
2000-03 
Low-Income Countries 3.4 2.6 13.9 11.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.6 5.3 40.7 27.0 
Source: Nkusu 2004, Table 1 and World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004 and 2005, Table 6.10. GNI is Gross 
National Income and GCF Gross Capital Formation. 
 
Until recently, ODA has been falling as a share of the gross national income of recipient 
countries and as share of their gross capital formation (Table 1).  In low-income countries, for 
example, aid accounted for about 12 per cent of gross capital formation in 2000-2003, which 
was down from almost 14 per cent in the early 1990s. In sub-Saharan Africa, this share declined 
from almost 41 per cent in the early 1990s to 27 per cent in 2000-2003. 
2  THE ‘DUTCH DISEASE’ DIAGNOSIS 
Fears of a ‘Dutch Disease’ customarily assume that a sizeable inflow of ODA will exacerbate 
macroeconomic instability, namely, by raising inflation and appreciating the real exchange 
rate. Moreover, it is also assumed that growth will be impaired because exchange-rate 
appreciation will hamper the competitiveness of a country’s export sector (Rajan and 
Subramaniam 2005). 
Let us examine whether such a chain of events is inexorable. In this regard, the IMF’s 
recent formulation of an analytical framework for assessing this phenomenon is a useful 
starting point (IMF 2005a and Gupta et al. 2005). It distinguishes between two dimensions of 
 Terry McKinley 3 
 
 
this process: 1) spending aid and 2) absorbing aid. For a real transfer of resources to occur, 
both spending and absorption should occur. However, this happens infrequently. 
The option of neither spending nor absorbing aid is not viable. Nonetheless, some 
countries, such as Ethiopia and Ghana, which have enjoyed a sizeable influx of ODA have tried 
this approach (IMF 2005a, p. 48). Many other countries have either spent aid without absorbing 
it or absorbed aid without spending it. It is rare for countries to have both spent and absorbed 
aid even though this represents the most desirable option. It is important to recognize that the 
timing of both actions could vary depending on country circumstances. Spending could be 
spread out over a period of time, as could absorption. 
How does a government spend aid? It transfers the foreign exchange provided by ODA to 
the central bank in return for an equivalent value of domestic currency. It then uses this 
domestic currency to purchase domestic goods and services.3 The surge in domestic purchases 
tends to drive up mainly the output prices of domestic non-tradables. One reason is that the 
output prices of tradables are determined, in contrast, by external markets. Another is that 
government expenditures are supposed to disproportionately favor non-tradables.  
When the output prices of non-tradables rise, their input prices (such as wages) can also 
rise. Such increases also spill over, however, to the input prices of tradables. Since the output 
prices of tradables are set by external competition, the profits of the tradable sector are 
squeezed. A rise in the prices of non-tradables vis-à-vis those of tradables will cause an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
The nominal exchange rate will have to depreciate in order to compensate for the rising 
domestic price level. If the exchange rate is flexible, market forces will eventually compel 
depreciation; if the exchange rate is fixed, the authorities will have to devalue the domestic 
currency. In the five countries experiencing aid surges that have been examined recently by 
the IMF (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda), there was depreciation of the 
exchange rate, not appreciation (IMF 2005a). In other words, ‘Dutch Disease’ effects were not 
immediately apparent. 
In response to the fall in profits due to rising input costs, resources are supposed to flow 
out of tradables and into non-tradables. If tradable sectors are more productive than non-
tradable sectors (because of the pressure to be efficient exerted by international competition), 
then the productivity of the whole economy should fall. 
3  HOW TO TREAT A ‘DUTCH DISEASE’ 
Assuming that such tendencies occur, how can they be countered? The immediate danger of a 
‘Dutch Disease’ depends, in large part, on the responsiveness of aggregate supply to a surge in 
domestic demand for goods and services. Many developing countries have idle, underutilized 
productive capacities that could be readily mobilized to respond to this increased demand 
(Nkusu 2004).  
Models that assess the threat of a ‘Dutch Disease’ often assume that economies are on 
their ‘production possibility frontier’—namely, fully utilizing all available productive resources. 
The corollary is that the expansion of public-sector spending inevitably ‘crowds-out’ private 
spending. The reality, in contrast, is that many economies experience widespread 
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unemployment and underemployment (Nkusu 2004). Once the unrealistic assumption of full 
employment is relaxed, the immediate likelihood of a ‘Dutch Disease’ diminishes. 
Nevertheless, even if productive resources are not fully utilized, underdeveloped 
economies are plagued by many specific supply bottlenecks, e.g., lack of infrastructure or 
skilled personnel. These problems suggest that governments should focus ODA on removing 
these bottlenecks, which impede the responsiveness of aggregate supply. Public investment 
can play a central role in this effort. 
An adverse impact of ODA could be partly mitigated if the government directly uses its 
new stock of foreign currency to purchase imports instead of domestic goods and services. 
This implies that this extra foreign currency leaks back out of the economy—instead of 
stimulating demand for domestic goods and services. Thus, the potential for inflation would 
be reduced. This option has, of course, disadvantages as well as advantages. The multiplier 
impact of government expenditures would be minimized, for instance. 
Government could enhance this option by importing capital goods, which should raise 
domestic productivity. This has been the traditional rationale for ODA (see Hussain and 
Chowdhury 1998, Chapter 4). The so-called “Two Gaps” model, which underlies this rationale, 
assumes that the main constraint on growth is lack of foreign exchange, not domestic savings. 
Nevertheless, even if capital goods are purchased, imports will still rise relative to exports, 
thereby exerting depreciating pressure on the exchange rate.  
If government purchases domestic goods and services, the potentially inflationary impact 
could be mitigated if it invested in public goods, such as roads, electricity grids, irrigation 
works, schools and health clinics. Such infrastructure increases the productivity of the private 
economy—eventually expanding aggregate supply in order to match the increase in 
aggregate demand from government expenditures. Under these circumstances, public 
investment will ‘crowd-in’, or stimulate, private investment.  
This could be a vital stimulus to sustaining a domestic process of capital accumulation. 
The positive effect of public investment on private investment in low-income countries, such 
as in sub-Saharan Africa, has recently been recognized by the IMF (Gupta et al. 2005).4 
However, the IMF stresses the importance of physical infrastructure. Instead of increasing in 
low-income countries, however, public investment has been falling. A recent IMF study of fiscal 
policies in eight pilot countries revealed that public investment had fallen by one per cent of 
GDP between 1994-98 and 1999-2003, compounding a negative earlier trend in many of them 
(IMF 2005c). 
In order to highlight the importance of public investment, it would be helpful to modify 
the way that it is treated in fiscal analysis. Public capital expenditures do not, for example, have 
the same impact as current expenditures. Thus, they should not be treated the same in fiscal 
terms. They create more public capital, increasing the net worth of government holdings. 
Moreover, they help expand the productive capacity of the whole economy.  
If government borrows to finance public investment, the presumption is that the 
increased revenue from higher growth would pay off the debt. Thus, the ratio of public debt to 
GDP should remain relatively stable. This implies that while the government should strive, over 
time, to keep the current budget in balance, it should have the leeway to borrow to finance 
capital expenditures (see IMF 2004 for the counter-argument). However, it would be preferable 
to use ODA (and grants in particular) to finance public investment. But fiscal analysis should 
 Terry McKinley 5 
 
 
help underscore the central importance of public investment in ensuring a positive impact of 
ODA on growth, instead of lumping capital and current government expenditures together. 
There are various ways in which public investment could help overcome ‘Dutch Disease’ 
effects and foster growth. Some analysts claim that the macroeconomic impact of ODA could 
be enhanced if public investment were directed to increasing the productivity of tradables 
(Rajan and Subramaniam 2005). This would attenuate inflationary pressures.5 But a similar 
impact could be achieved through increasing productivity in non-tradable sectors since their 
prices initially rise because of the disproportionate increase in demand for their output (see 
Adams and Bevan 2004).6 In any case, these options illustrate that fiscal policy is capable of 
mitigating a ‘Dutch Disease’. One of the major channels would be public investment because  
it can stimulate private investment and direct resources to expand aggregate supply in 
strategic economic sectors. 
4  SUPPORTIVE MONETARY AND EXCHANGE-RATE POLICIES 
To be fully effective, fiscal policy has to be supported by monetary and exchange-rate policies. 
This will depend on the actions of the central bank, namely, how it uses the ODA-supplied 
foreign exchange that it receives from the government. The central bank could keep the 
foreign exchange tucked away as reserves, and let the impact of government expenditures 
take its course. The impact is then likely to be inflationary.  
Alternatively, it could sell the foreign exchange to the private sector, thereby drawing 
domestic currency back out of the economy. By buying domestic currency and selling foreign 
currency, the central bank contributes to appreciating the nominal exchange rate (undoing 
some of the depreciating impact of the original injection of liquidity through government 
expenditures). In the short-to-medium term, this appreciation might adversely affect the 
tradable sector. But well designed public investment programmes could nullify this impact 
over time. Moreover, the danger of a ‘Dutch Disease’ appreciation might be exaggerated if  
the aggregate effect of government expenditures has already been pushing in the opposite 
direction, namely, depreciating the exchange rate. 
The availability of additional foreign exchange—along with the effect of appreciation—
should facilitate the purchase of imports. Such a course of action would not normally result in 
balance of payments problems since aid is, in effect, financing the increase in the current-
account deficit.  
Of course, the composition of net imports matters, particularly for growth prospects.  
If the imports are capital goods, growth could be accelerated. If the imports are basic foods, 
for example, they could help hold down domestic food prices, and thereby improve the 
consumption of poor households. If the imports are luxury consumer items, the rich could 
benefit, and opportunities to raise growth or directly enhance human well-being might  
be diminished. 
The appreciation of the exchange rate plays an integral role in boosting net imports, and 
thereby causing a transfer of real resources. But the appreciation could also affect the capital 
account, precipitating an outflow, especially if wealth holders then expect depreciation. 
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Basically, in the short run the foreign exchange provided by ODA can either be stored as 
reserves, used to purchase imports or leak out of the economy as capital outflows. Purchasing 
imports is usually the preferable option. If an economy is unstable, the private sector could use 
the additional foreign exchange to take capital out of the economy. However, if the central 
bank fears such an outcome, it could retain the foreign exchange as reserves—or sell the 
reserves over an extended period of time. These are the short-run options open to 
policymakers when they contemplate spending and absorbing ODA. 
5  THE ACCUMULATION OF RESERVES 
Often, monetary authorities have opted to accumulate reserves. This is one of the drawbacks 
of allowing independence of the central bank. The results: the expansionary impact of fiscal 
policy is neutralized by restrictive monetary or exchange-rate policies. The two sets of policies 
are inconsistent. Fiscal policy should lead and monetary and exchange-rate policies should 
move in the same direction. 
Central banks of developing countries have been building up foreign-exchange reserves 
at a rapid rate in recent years (Table 2). Reserves more than tripled, for example, between 1996 
and 2004. In East Asia and the Pacific, they increased by over 3.8 times and in South Asia by 
about 5.7 times (from a much smaller base). The increase was smaller in sub-Saharan Africa, i.e., 
2.8 times. Nevertheless, such a build-up of reserves has notable opportunity costs since these 
resources could have been used to finance domestic investment. A recent paper by Stiglitz and 
Charlton (2005) argues that such an excessive build-up of reserves imparts a deflationary bias 
to the economies of developing countries. Accumulating reserves takes precedence over 
investing in growth.  
TABLE 2 
Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves of Developing Countries 1996-2004 ($ billions) 
Group 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004e 
All Developing Countries 519 588 668 922 1592 
East Asia & Pacific 200 233 273 408 775 
South Asia 25 33 43 80 142 
Sub-Saharan Africa 21 27 34 35 58 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2005, Table A.48 ‘e’ means estimated. 
 
This large precautionary build-up has been a reaction to the instability triggered by the 
increased globalization of financial flows. The lack of regulation of the capital account has also 
contributed to making monetary policies more restrictive because it leaves countries very 
vulnerable to financial shocks. As a consequence, significant proportions of ODA have been 
diverted into reserves, aborting the transfer of real resources into developing countries (see 
the case studies of Ethiopia and Ghana in IMF 2005a).  
As a related phenomenon, many developing countries have been striving in recent years 
to achieve sizeable current account surpluses. This implies that they have been saving more 
than they have invested. Thus, they have been exporting their ‘excess’ savings—mostly to rich 
industrial countries such as the United States (McKinley forthcoming). Table 3 shows that the 
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aggregate current account balance of all developing countries swung from a deficit of about 
US$ 94 billion in 1998 to a surplus of about US$ 113 billion in 2003. During this period, net 
equity and debt flows changed little while capital flight (part of the ‘balancing item’) slowed 
down. However, what skyrocketed—by a factor of 18—was the yearly change in reserves. 
Unfortunately, through holding foreign-exchange reserves, developing countries are financing 
a higher level of consumption in rich countries, not growth in their own economies. 
TABLE 3 
External Financing of all Developing Countries 1998 and 2003 ($ billions) 
 1998 2003 
Current Account Balance -93.7 112.8 
Net Equity Flows 178.1 176.6 
Net Debt Flow 54.9 60.0 
‘Balancing Item’a -122.9 -57.4 
Change in Reservesb -16.3 -291.9 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2005, Table A.21.  
Notes: ‘a’ includes errors and omissions and net acquisition of foreign assets. ‘b’: a negative denotes an increase. 
6  THE EFFECTS OF RESERVE ACCUMULATION 
Instead of piling up as reserves, ODA should serve as a mechanism to facilitate the transfer of 
more real resources to developing countries. This aim is accomplished, in effect, by increasing 
net imports—namely, financing more imports of resources and slowing down the exports of 
resources. In order to achieve this objective, however, central banks have to release the foreign 
exchange provided by ODA. Any so-called ‘Dutch Disease’ effects are likely to be an integral 
part of this desired transfer of resources, not a clinical disorder. 
What is apparent from the gross statistics is that because governments have become 
traumatized about the danger of ‘Dutch Disease’, they have been aborting a resource transfer 
by stockpiling ODA-supplied foreign exchange as reserves. This is an example of “spending but 
not absorbing ODA”. In this case, if the government wants to combat domestic inflation, it will 
have to ‘sterilize’ the additional injection of domestic currency by selling government 
securities in exchange for it. Its net foreign assets, i.e., its foreign exchange reserves, will rise 
but its net domestic assets will decline correspondingly since its liabilities (e.g., bonds) to the 
private sector will increase.7  
The downside of such a policy is that domestic real rates of interest would likely rise in 
order to attract buyers of government securities. Hence, private investment could be 
negatively affected. Moreover, the immediate opportunity cost of hoarding the reserves would 
be the lack of absorption of additional real resources, such as capital imports. The economy 
would suffer not only because loanable funds would become more expensive but also because 
capital imports would be minimized. Sterilization through selling government securities is 
designed to reduce the inflation precipitated by the ODA-induced increase in government 
expenditures (and the ensuing increase in the money supply). However, a more effective 
option would be to sell the foreign exchange accumulated as a result of aid, instead of 
“spending but not absorbing aid”. 
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7  THE FEAR OF INFLATION 
Some governments have chosen another option altogether, namely, “absorbing ODA but not 
spending it”. Under this scenario, government expenditures do not increase. Instead, the 
domestic-currency equivalent of ODA could be used to reduce the existing stock of debt. 
Governments might find such an option attractive if they face large debt burdens or high 
inflation. By thereafter selling ODA-supplied foreign exchange to the private sector, central 
banks can draw domestic currency out of the economy and reduce inflationary pressures. 
However, since the growth of the money supply would slow, the exchange rate is likely to 
appreciate, perhaps markedly. The reason is that there never was the initial expansion of 
government expenditures.  
This strategy relies on stabilization of the economy and a decline in interest rates (because 
of reduced debt) to stimulate private investment. But such an outcome is uncertain, especially 
since the domestic money supply is contracting (and putting upward pressure on the interest 
rate). Moreover, the tradable sector is likely to suffer. And public investment will not be able to 
serve as a stimulus to the economy. 
Fear of inflation and associated macroeconomic instability is a prime factor in 
motivating authorities to sterilize ODA-induced government spending (by selling securities) 
or not to spend ODA at all. In both cases, the result will be an accumulation of ‘idle’ reserves. 
Governments are likely to choose such a suboptimal alternative because they have been 
urged to employ monetary policies that adhere to strict ‘inflation targeting’ (either explicitly 
or implicitly).  
TABLE 4 
CPI Inflation, 1991-2003 (% change in local currency) 
Group 1991-2000 2001 2002 2003 
World 3.3 1.5 2.0 1.8 
Developing Countries 8.6 3.9 3.4 3.9 
--Upper Middle Income 7.3 3.2 1.9 2.6 
--Lower Middle Income 8.3 4.6 3.8 4.2 
--Low Income 10.2 3.8 3.9 5.2 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2005, Table A.9. 
 
Utilizing such policies, developing countries have been strenuously trying to reduce 
inflation since the early 1990s. Table 4 shows that while average CPI inflation in all developing 
countries was 8.6 per cent during the 1990s, it was down to only 3.9 in 2003. The trend of 
declining inflation characterized all three categories of developing countries: upper middle-
income, lower middle-income and low-income. Inflation rates are now, on average, in low 
single digits in developing countries.  
Such rates are consistent with the target range of 3-5 per cent per year frequently 
incorporated in IMF programmes. However, striving to maintain such low inflation can have a 
deflationary impact on growth, particularly because such an approach often relies on 
maintaining high real rates of interest. Such a policy stance can precipitate prolonged 
recessionary conditions, in fact, if the source of inflation is adverse supply shocks—a common 
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occurrence in low-income countries (see IMF 2005b, p.24). Such a restrictive stance is of 
particular concern now with the rise in international oil prices.  
As a result, the IMF has recently moderated its stance to accommodate inflation rates of  
5-10 per cent, instead of insisting on rates in low single digits (IMF 2005b, p. 19). Allowing 
inflation to rise to moderate levels stems from the recognition that a dramatic scaling up of ODA, 
as envisaged for the MDGs, will expand domestic demand pressures, at least in the short run. 
8  THE NEED FOR CAPITAL IMPORTS AND DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
Relaxing inflation targets is a welcome, though limited, change. It will encourage governments 
to spend ODA instead of stockpiling it as reserves. But a ‘Dutch Disease’ phobia will still 
discourage governments from using ODA as a means to finance an increase in net imports. 
This will imply that resources will not be freed up from exports and import substitutes for 
allocation to domestic investment.  
The following macroeconomic identity highlights the desirable general scenario. 
 
Y  ≡  (IG  + CG)↑  + IP + CP  + (X  M)↓ 
 
The identity indicates that if ODA is both spent and absorbed, then government 
expenditures (IG and CG) should increase while net exports (X – M) should decrease. There is a 
transfer of real resources that is initially accommodated through a boost in real government 
expenditures. But such a transfer is not a sufficient condition for sustaining economic growth. 
This will depend, in part, on whether net imports accommodate an increase in capital imports 
and government expenditures accommodate an increase in public investment. 
For sustainable economic growth to occur, capital imports (MK) will have to contribute to 
an increase in private investment (IP). Similarly, public investment (IG) will have to increase and 
be able to stimulate private investment. Boosting investment will have a multiplier impact on 
income. These two channels, capital imports and public investment, are depicted below. 
 
∆MK  →  ∆IP 
 
∆IG  →  ∆IP 
As a second-round effect of increased government expenditures, private expenditures 
should rise. At issue is the relative importance of private consumption (CP) and private 
investment (IP). 
9  MOBILIZING DOMESTIC RESOURCES 
ODA’s impact on domestic investment is a crucial issue. Equally important is the impact of 
ODA on domestic resource mobilization, namely, on the ability (and willingness) of the 
government to mobilize public revenue and the desire of the private sector (households and 
businesses) to save.  
10 International Poverty Centre Working Paper nº 10 
 
 
An influx of ODA that finances government deficits could be a disincentive to 
governments to augment public revenues.8 While this impact is plausible, the evidence for it is 
mixed. A 2003 IMF study finds a modest negative impact of aid on the mobilization of 
domestic revenues, especially if aid is provided through grants not loans (Gupta et al. 2003). 
However, it is difficult to separate such a second-round effect from other overriding factors, 
such as trade liberalization (Keen and Simone 2004).9 
The impact of ODA on the mobilization of domestic revenue deserves more expanded 
treatment than is provided here. It is clear, however, that a priority for the use of ODA should 
be to enhance national capacities to mobilize public revenue. On average, tax revenue has 
fallen marginally or changed very little in recent years in developing countries (Table 5). The 
unweighted average for tax revenue as a percentage to GDP in low-income countries is now 
about 15 per cent. But this average level should be regarded as a minimal threshold. 
Governments need to find ways to augment revenues to a level that is at least one fifth of GDP 
if they are to attain the capacity to supply essential public services and finance their own 
public investment. 
TABLE 5 
Tax Revenue in Developing Countries (Per cent of GDP)  
Group Tax Revenue  (Early 1990s) 
Tax Revenue 
(Early 2000s) 
Developing Countries 17.9 17.6 
Low-Income Countriesa 15.2 14.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.3 15.9 
Asia & Pacific 13.6 13.2 
Source: Keen and Simone 2004 (referenced in Gupta et al. 2005, Table A5). ‘a’ denotes PRGF-eligible countries. 
Note: Percentages are unweighted averages. 
 
In addition to concern about a negative impact of ODA on domestic revenue, there is also 
concern that an aid surge will weaken efforts to raise domestic savings. This will depend, to a 
great extent, on whether ODA boosts both public investment and private investment. 
The following macroeconomic identity helps clarify the relationship among savings, 
investment and the trade balance. In a non-conventional way, it separates out public 
investment (IG) from government consumption (CG) in order to highlight the role of both public 
and private investment. Hence, the left hand side of the macroeconomic identity represents 
private savings (SP) and public savings, which is defined by the current budget balance—i.e., 
taxes (T) minus current government expenditures (CG).10 
 
Sp + (T  CG)  ≡  IP↑ + IG↑ + (X  M)↓  
 
What the identity shows is that if the real exchange rate appreciates, then the trade 
balance will deteriorate because imports (M) will rise relative to exports (X). This could 
correspond to a lower level of domestic savings. But a significant proportion of ODA-financed 
government expenditures injected into the economy should be public investment (IG). And 
such investment, along with other supportive public measures, should stimulate private 
investment (IP).  
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Hence, increases in public and private investment should correspond to an increase in 
domestic savings. The identity illustrates that the impact of ODA on domestic savings is 
integrally related to the performance of investment. But the identity does not reveal the 
behavioral relations among these variables. For instance, the debate between Neo-classical 
economists and Keynesians is over the causual relationship between savings and investment. 
Does investment boost savings (through the Keynesian multiplier) or does savings determine 
investment (through Say’s law of supply creating demand)? 
As an injection of foreign savings, ODA has the potential to bolster domestic investment. 
But this depends, in the first instance, on ODA’s conversion into public investment. If 
government expenditures fuel a domestic consumption boom, this is likely to spill over into an 
intensified appetite for imported consumption goods. As ODA-induced consumption grows, 
private savings (SP or disposable income minus consumption) is likely to fall. 
Transforming aid into domestic public investment is critical to forestalling such a trend. 
But also critical is the development of a healthy domestic financial system. Despite enjoying 
financial deepening since the 1990s, commercial banks in developing countries remain 
reluctant to lend for long-term productive investment (see McKinley 2005). Instead, they lend 
primarily for short-term purposes, i.e., for consumer durables, working capital, trade and 
government securities. When governments attempt to ‘sterilize’ ODA-provided foreign 
exchange reserves, as this paper has already discussed, they are likely to drive up the real rate 
of interest and dampen the demand for loanable funds. This will abort the expansion of the 
economy that the ODA-financed increase in government expenditures could have stimulated. 
The weakness of the financial system in most developing countries highlights the need 
for directing a significant proportion of ODA to strengthening it. This represents a form of 
‘investment’ in national capacities that—like development of the state’s capacity to mobilize 
revenue—can reap high returns. Strengthening the financial system is essential to 
mobilizing domestic savings and allocating it to private investment, and thus to long-term 
sustainable growth.11 
10  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The response of this paper to the question in its title (“Why Is ‘The Dutch Disease’ Always a 
Disease?”) is that the impact of ODA need not be negative. ‘Dutch Disease’ symptoms, such an 
appreciation in the real exchange rate, might arise in the wake of a surge in ODA but such 
symptoms can be a sign that ODA is having its intended effect, namely, promoting a transfer of 
real resources to developing countries. 
An ill-advised use of an ODA surge can pose macroeconomic problems, such as rising 
inflation and an appreciating exchange rate can. But if the additional foreign exchange is used 
not only to increase government expenditures but also to boost net imports, these problems 
should be manageable. In other words, the best use of ODA is to both ‘spend and absorb’ it. 
The composition of government expenditures and the composition of net imports do 
matter, however. If ODA is to contribute to sustainable growth, governments should prioritize 
public investment and encourage capital imports. Both can help contribute to an ensuing rise 
in private investment relative to private consumption. If an ODA surge is allowed to fuel 
primarily a consumption boom, then its long-term net impact might well be negative.  
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This paper stresses the importance of channeling aid into strengthening national 
capacities to mobilize public revenue and domestic savings. Most governments in developing 
countries need more public revenue, not less. So ODA should not be allowed to substitute for 
more concerted efforts to improve tax systems. Similarly, financial systems need to be 
strengthened in order to improve the mobilization of domestic private savings. Additional 
incentives and reforms are also needed to encourage financial institutions to lend for long-
term private investment. These are issues related to the longer-term challenge of enhancing 
the ‘absorptive capacity’ of developing countries. 
Governments should be able to manage the short-run macroeconomic effects of a surge 
in ODA. The ultimate impact of ODA depends, however, on how it affects public revenue and 
domestic savings. While this paper introduces these issues, a fuller discussion will be taken up 
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1. The term ‘Dutch Disease’ was used to describe the adverse impact of a discovery of natural gas on Dutch 
manufacturing because of a surge in income and consequent appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
2. ODA could be used for multiple desirable purposes. It could prevent a decline in human development, such as 
combating the HIV/AIDs epidemic. It could directly promote human development, such as improving child nutrition. Or it 
could contribute to domestic investment, such as in infrastructure or human technical capabilities, which should 
accelerate economic growth. This paper concentrates on the last aspect. 
3. It could also import foreign goods and services—a point to which we return later. 
4. “Public investment can crowd-in private investment in [sub-Saharan Africa]. Crowding-in likely reflects the 
complementarity of private investment with some components of public investment, especially infrastructure” (Gupta et 
al., 2005, p. 25). 
5. Even if the real exchange rate appreciates, this could benefit tradable sectors if a sizeable proportion of their inputs 
were imported. In addition, governments could use various measures—such as the targeted selling of foreign 
exchange—which could enhance the competitiveness of export sectors by facilitating their access to imports. 
6. Adams and Bevan maintain that such a focus on non-tradables would have a regressive distributional impact on the 
poor. Others have argued that promoting tradables would be pro-poor. However, a much more disaggregated approach 
would be needed in order to clarify the distributional implications. The categories of  ‘tradables’ and. ‘non-tradables’ are 
too broad to lend themselves to useful policy conclusions. 
7. The central bank could have achieved a similar impact by increasing the reserve requirements of commercial banks or 
moving public-sector deposits from commercial banks to the central bank. 
8. Some commentators advocate that ODA should be used to lower tax revenue in order to transfer more resources to 
the private sector. But most developing countries need to raise their level of tax revenue, not lower it.  
9. In those countries with decreases in revenue, trade liberalization has often been a major cause. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
for example, trade taxes have dropped by two percentage points of GDP; this represents a decline of over one third in 
such revenue (Gupta et al. 2005, Table A5). 
10. As discussed earlier, some fiscal analysts have advocated that the IMF should shift the focus of its budget analysis 
from the overall fiscal balance (including capital expenditures) to the current fiscal balance in order to give greater 
encouragement for financing infrastructure (see IMF 2004). Our macroeconomic identity is based on this procedure. 
11. The need for strengthening financial institutions in developing countries should be obvious whether one’s 
perspective on the savings-investment relationship is Neo-classical or Keynesian. We reserve a more elaborate discussion 
of the savings-investment nexus for another paper. 
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